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Abstract We theoretically and experimentally study voter behavior in a setting
characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting. Voters choose from three
options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment
where Condorcet cycles may occur and focus on how information about the pref-
erence distribution affects strategic behavior. We also vary the relative importance
of the second preferred option. Quantal response equilibrium analysis is used to
analyze the game and derive predictions. Our results indeed show that strategic
voting arises. Its extent depends on (i) information availability; (ii) the relative
importance of the intermediate candidate; (iii) the electorate’s relative support for
one’s preferred candidate; (iv) the relative position of the plurality-supported can-
didate in one’s preference ordering. Our results show that information serves as a
coordination device where strategic voting does not harm the plurality-preferred
candidate’s chances of winning.
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1 Introduction
Since its introduction in ancient Greece, democracy has always been associated with
‘government by the people’. A widespread view is that the democratic decision
process must honor the desire of the majority (Goldfinger 2004). Voting is the tool
most often used for this purpose. The underlying assumption is that voting correctly
aggregates individual preferences. A sufficient condition for correct aggregation is
that every voter casts a vote for her most preferred alternative. Of course, not
everyone does so. For one thing, many people abstain from voting (especially in
large scale elections). Moreover, voters may strategically vote for an alternative that
is not ranked highest in their preference ordering (Farquharson 1969). The reason is
that any election is not only a manifestation of individual preferences, but also a
multi-person decision process (Downs 1957; Riker 1982a; Blais and Nadeau 1996).
In such a strategic interaction a voter may be more interested in optimizing the
outcome than in stating her own preference.
In this paper, we investigate such strategic voting in a controlled (laboratory)
environment. Our aim is to carefully isolate important determinants of the strategic
vote. In particular, we are interested in the effect on strategic voting of information
about others’ preferences and the relative attractiveness of the second-best
alternative.
When considering voting as a multi-person decision process it can be analyzed as
a strategic game in which distinct strategies might lead to different outcomes and
equilibria can be computed. It has long been recognized that strategic voting may be
an equilibrium strategy in committees (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996), legislatures
(Riker 1982a) and even in large electorates (Palfrey 1989; Fey 1997). Of course,
strategic voting equilibria may involve highly complex computations that go beyond
the capabilities of most voters. Behaviorally, voters may rely on simple voting
heuristics such as always voting sincerely for the most preferred alternative. In
addition, some people may object morally to voting strategically (Lehtinen 2007). In
the end, the question whether or not voters vote strategically is an empirical one.1
An example illustrates situations when strategic voting may occur. If the most
preferred option does not stand a chance, a voter may vote for her second ranked
option in an attempt to avoid even worse outcomes. Such behavior is consistent, for
1 For (indirect) empirical evidence of strategic voting in legislatures, see Clinton Joshua and Meirowitz
(2004). Using a clever identification strategy, Kawai and Watanabe (2013) estimate that only a small
fraction of Japanese voters engage in strategic voting (which they call ‘misaligned’ voting) in Japanese
House of Representatives elections. For large electorates Cain (1978) and Myatt and Fisher (2002)
provide empirical evidence from the UK, Alvarez and Roderick Kiewiet (2009) from California, and
Blais and Nadeau (1996) and Blais et al. (2001) from Canada. A difficulty in using field data to
empirically assess the occurrence of strategic voting is the fact that it requires knowledge of the voters’
preference orderings over the alternatives. Some have tried to overcome this by eliciting preferences
using survey questions (Cain 1978; Blais and Nadeau 1996; Blais et al. 2001; Myatt and Fisher 2002).
Such measurement is subject to noise and strategic reporting, however. Moreover, while analyses using
observational field data allow one to study the occurrence of strategic voting per se, they do not really
allow for a systematic study of its causes and consequences.
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example, with Duverger’s law.2 A special case occurs when there is a Condorcet
loser (i.e., an alternative that would lose any pairwise vote against any other
alternative) supported by a minority while a majority is divided between two other
alternatives (Gerber et al. 1988; Forsythe et al. 1993, 1996; Cox 1997; Myatt and
Fisher 2002; Palfrey 2006). The majority can avoid a victory by the Condorcet loser
if the supporters of one of the two majority alternatives votes strategically for the
second most preferred option. Though our goal is to better understand the
occurrence of strategic voting, we do not consider situations with a Condorcet loser.
Instead, we are interested in situations where there are Condorcet cycles. In our
environment, each of three alternatives (denoted by A, B, and C) has a similar a
priori chance of winning the election and each voter faces an a priori symmetric
strategic problem. A cycle occurs because sincere voting can lead to any of the
alternatives winning if they are voted on sequentially in pairwise votes. We will see
below, that the occurrence of Condorcet cycles yields incentives to vote
strategically when decisions are made by plurality rule.
We use laboratory experiments for our empirical analysis of strategic voting.
Before doing so, we first model the situation as a strategic game. In particular, we
will derive Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE) and use these to formulate
behavioral predictions. QRE accurately predicts voter behavior in many environ-
ments (Goeree and Holt 2005; Levine and Palfrey 2007; Grober and Schram 2010).
It has the intuitive advantage that it allows for boundedly rational behavior while at
the same time assuming that the error people make declines as the stakes become
larger. Our QRE predictions will be tested using our experimental data.
Laboratory control will allow us to measure the impact of changes in the
environment on the decision whether or not to vote strategically. Specifically, we
are interested in the two circumstances mentioned above. First, we will study how
the relative value attributed to the second preferred option affects voters’ decisions.
This is important because, intuitively, voters are more likely to vote strategically
when there is little to lose by having their second option chosen (Blais et al. 2001).
Second, we will measure the impact of information about others’ preferences. This
is important, because whether or not voters vote strategically may depend on how
much they know about other voters’ preferences (Forsythe et al. 1993, 1996).
Outside the laboratory opinion polls serve to provide such information, which may
help voters to coordinate on an alternative and win the election. Voluntary
preference revelation in polls may be strategic, however. In order to isolate the
effect of information, we therefore opt for a situation in which an opinion poll
truthfully reveals the electorate’s preferences (as in Großer and Schram 2010).
Perfect information about the other voters’ preferences will in some of our
treatments be made available before the election.3
2 Duverger’s law predicts that in a plurality vote the votes will converge to two candidates, mainly due to
the psychological phenomenon of the ‘wasted vote’. Voters supporting a candidate with low perceived
chances of winning are assumed likely to move their vote to the more preferred option of the leading two
(e.g., Riker 1982b; Palfrey 1989).
3 Alternatively, one could consider sequential elections like the U.S. primaries, where information about
others’ preferences may be obtained from previous elections. Morton and Williams (1999, 2001) use this
to study information asymmetries regarding candidates’ identities. The information we provide can be
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With this information, the decision problem faced by each voter may be even
more complex than without. This is because without information all voters face the
same a priori situation if every preference ordering is equally likely. Assume for the
case with information that supporters of the alternative with the largest support (we
call this the ‘majoritarian candidate’) vote sincerely but comprise less than 50 % of
the electorate. Which voters should then vote strategically? On the one hand, one
may think that the supporters of the alternative with the lowest level of support have
an incentive to vote strategically to increase their chances. On the other hand, voters
for whom the majoritarian candidate is second best may decide to support this to
ensure at least this second-best. Whether or not they do so may depend on the
relative value they attribute to this option. We will address these issues theoretically
and behaviorally in this paper.
When preferences are not revealed by polls, all voters face the same situation.
The QRE prediction is then that all voters have the same probability of voting
strategically and this probability increases with the value attributed to the
intermediate option. This comparative static prediction is confirmed by our data.
With information about the other voters’ preferences, the prediction depends on the
number of others supporting the same alternative and this alternative’s rank (in
terms of support) within the electorate. It also depends on the relative value
attributed to the second most preferred alternative. The experimental results are
largely in line with the QRE predictions. Two important conclusions for the
scenario with information are that (i) a higher frequency of strategic voting is
observed, the higher is the relative utility of a voter’s second most preferred option;
(ii) there is coordination on the victory of the majoritarian candidate. All in all, our
results show that strategic voting is an important phenomenon and follows a pattern
that to a large extent can be rationalized using the boundedly rational framework
offered by QRE.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 presents theoretical
analysis and equilibrium predictions. The experimental design is introduced in
Sect. 3. Section 4 presents the results and Sect. 5 offers concluding remarks.
2 The model
Each of N voters must choose from three alternatives, A, B and C. Each voter
i = 1,…, N has a strict preference ordering over these alternatives and must cast
exactly one vote. Plurality rule determines the winner, with ties broken by an equal
probability random draw. The assumption of mandatory voting allows us to focus on
the voting decision without needing to correct for the interaction with the turnout
decision. Moreover, the mandatory rule makes strategic voting more salient, since
voters are obliged to decide. Mandatory voting exists in many committees and
Footnote 3 continued
seen as a ‘noiseless’ early opinion poll, reflecting more the actual preferences than the intended voting
behavior. Early polls are not necessarily good predictors of election outcomes. Opinion polls closer to the
election tend to capture more strategic behavior and aim basically at predicting the election outcome
(McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986; Gelman and King 1993; Brown et al. 1999; Erikson and Wlezien 2001).
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legislators (Nitzan and Procaccia 1986). For national elections, only a minority of
countries has mandatory voting (Gratschew 2001), though it is still prevalent in cer-
tain regions, like Latin America. Note that even in the absence of mandatory voting
many people may feel sufficient warm glow, social pressure or sense of civic duty to
vote. We therefore expect our results to be relevant beyond the particular case of
mandatory voting assumed here.
Voters are assumed to maximize (expected) utility, where a voter’s utility is
determined by the rank of the elected alternative in her preference ordering. If her
preferred, intermediate or least preferred alternative is elected she receives ub, um or
ul respectively. Without loss of generality we normalize by setting ub = 10 and
ul = 1. Then, each voter’s preferences are characterized by um, the utility attributed
to the intermediate option. Finally, we assume that utility is independent of
individuals and options, i.e., um is the same for every voter.4 Hence, only the
ordering of the three options distinguishes voters from one another.
We further assume that before an election all voters’ preferences are determined
randomly, independently of previous preferences and of other voter’s draws. The
own preferences are revealed to the voter by nature before the election. The extent
of information about other’s preferences is a variable in the model. The setting can
be either uninformed, in which case voters (aside from their own preference
ordering) know only the prior probability distribution of preferences, or informed, in
which case they know the ex-post realized distribution of preferences for the
election concerned. This variable is meant to capture the possible publication of
(noiseless) pre-election polls, as described in the introduction.
An electorate is, therefore, characterized by the number of voters, the distribution
of preferences, um, and the extent of pre-election information. We define sincere
voting as a vote for the most preferred option. A strategic vote is defined as a vote
for the second-ranked alternative in the preference ordering (as in Blais and Nadeau
1996; Blais et al. 2001; Cain 1978). The third option, voting for the least preferred
option, will only be considered as noisy behavior, because it is a dominated strategy:
there is no circumstance under which this could serve the purpose of expected utility
maximization.
Because we are most interested in strategic voting caused by the environment and
not so much in specific characteristics of the distinct options, we will focus on a
game in which every voter has an a priori symmetric problem regardless of his/her
preference ordering. We therefore restrict the possible preferences to {(A, B, C); (B,
C, A); (C, A, B)}, in which the listed order represents the preference ordering.
Preferences are independently and randomly drawn from this set with equal
probability for each voter. These preferences will typically form a Condorcet cycle,
potentially giving rise to strategic behavior. Moreover, there are no Condorcet losers
in our setup. We define NABC as the number of voters with preference ordering (A, B,
C) [i.e., u(A) = 10; u(B) = um; u(C) = 1], and similarly NBCA and NCAB. Note that
by construction NABC ? NBCA ? NCAB = N. Finally, we denote the election
outcome by a vector v : (vA, vB, vC) such that vA ? vB ? vC = N, where vk
denotes the number of votes for option k.
4 Our results are robust to heterogeneity in um (Tyszler and Schram 2013).
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2.1 Equilibrium analysis
Typically, multiple Nash equilibria exist in voting games. Take, for example, a
situation in which N = 3 K (K C 3) and each preference ordering is equally
represented (K voters each) while there is complete information. Then, all situations
are Nash equilibria in which voters in exactly two groups vote sincerely and the
voters in the remaining group all vote strategically. The election outcome would be,
for example, v = (0, 2 K, K) and since no voter is pivotal, no one can benefit from
deviating. Another Nash equilibrium is where only one group votes sincerely, with
the other two voting strategically. Again, nobody is pivotal. Sincere voting by all
may also be an equilibrium. Such voting behavior leads to an expected payoff of
(ub ? um ? ul)/3 = (11 ? um)/3. If there are equal numbers of voters for each
preference ordering each voter is pivotal, however. Voting strategically will
therefore tip the balance to the own second preferred option and yield payoff um. As
long as um B (11 ? um)/3, everyone voting sincerely is a Nash Equilibrium.5 To
tackle the multiple equilibria problem one can employ an equilibrium selection
device. The QRE approach adopted here has as a spinoff that it constitutes such a
refinement in the sense that it selects specific Nash equilibria as a special case.
For a variety of political choice problems, QRE, and in particular the Multinomial
Logit equilibrium (MLE) (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995) better predicts individual
choices than Nash equilibrium (Goeree and Holt 2005). For example, it can account for
the (seemingly irrational) high turnout rates in large-scale national elections, where
Nash predicts unrealistically low turnout (Levine and Palfrey 2007).
2.1.1 Uninformed setting
Consider first the situation without information about other voters’ preferences. The
voter knows only the prior distribution of probabilities, the electorate size, the value
of the intermediate option and her own preference. Knowing her own preference she
can update the probability distribution and use this to calculate the probability of
being pivotal given others’ strategies. Subsequently, she can compute her expected
payoff differences between voting sincerely, strategically or for the least preferred
alternative.
This rather complicated computation is easiest understood by an example.
Consider the case N = 12 (which is the electorate size used in our experiments). For
a given voter, the most likely distributions among the other voters are (3, 4, 4), (4, 3,
4) and (4, 4, 3), where the first number indicates the number of other voters with the
same preference, and the other two the number in the remaining groups. If she
believes that all others are voting sincerely this voter considers herself to be pivotal
in all three situations (in the first she can create a tie, in the latter two she can break
a tie). In the first situation her sincere vote would create a three-way tie and voting
5 There are also equilibria in which members of the same group act differently. Take K even and K C 6.
Assume two groups voting sincerely. If the remaining group has half of its members voting sincerely and
half voting for their second most preferred alternative, the voting outcome could be v = (K, K/2, 3 K/2).
Once again nobody is pivotal and this is an equilibrium.
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strategically would give the victory to her second most preferred candidate. Voting
sincerely may be profitable, depending on the value of the intermediate option.6 For
the other two situations voting sincerely is always a best response, since the voter is
decisive in favor of her most preferred candidate. Considering only these three
situations voting sincerely would likely be a best response. In fact, considering all
pivotal situations with their respective probabilities it can be shown that voting
sincerely is more profitable than voting strategically. Thus, all players voting
sincerely constitutes a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium, regardless of the inter-mediate
preference parameter um.
As explained in online Appendix A, this Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is the
limiting MLE of the game of incomplete information as the error parameter in this
QRE (denoted by l) approaches zero (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). Figure 1 shows
the corresponding Multinomial Logit Correspondences (MLC; this gives the set of
MLE and corresponding error parameters) for voting bodies of size N = 12. See
online Appendix E for corresponding graphs for larger voting bodies. We consider
two values for the intermediate option: high (um = 8) and low (um = 3), which are
the values that we use in our experiments.
Note that for l;0, the probability of sincere voting converges to 1. Hence, for the
case of incomplete information (no polls) the limiting MLE is the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium without strategic voting, irrespective of um. At the other extreme, when
noise dominates behavior (l ? ?), the vote becomes a random choice and voting
sincerely, strategically or for the dominated option each occur with probability 1/3.
For the intermediate cases where rationality is somewhat bounded [l [ (0,?)], the
MLE probabilities of voting depend on the value attributed to the intermediate
option. Previous estimates of l using data from voting experiments yield values
between 0.4 and 0.8.7 We will therefore focus some of our discussion on this range
of l values. As explained below, we will use for our specific predictions an out-of-
sample estimation of the error parameter, which is l = 0.55. This falls exactly
within the range.
Note that the probabilities of voting for the distinct options strongly depend on
both l and um. First, it takes a high value of l for voting for the dominated action
(not shown) to be likely. When random noise does not dominate behavior (l\ 1)
the probability of voting for the third option is less than 10 % and the choice is
basically between voting sincerely or strategically. For um = 8, l = 1, for example,
the MLE probability of voting sincerely is 0.56 and the probability of voting
strategically is 0.36. Hence, the probability of voting for the dominated option is
0.08. As for um, for um = 8, the probability of voting strategically exceeds 0.25 for a
wide range of l-values. The intuition is that although the limiting (Bayesian Nash)
equilibrium is to vote sincerely, one does not lose too much by choosing the second-
best. Therefore, an ‘error’ to the best response is not very costly and more likely to
occur in the MLE. Focusing on l values between 0.4 and 0.8, the equilibrium
6 Voting sincerely is strictly profitable if (ub ? um ? ul)/3[ um () um\ 5.5, where we use ub = 10
and ul = 1. Therefore if the value attributed to the intermediate option is low enough, voting sincerely
and creating a tie is the best response. If it is high enough, voting strategically is the best response.
7 For example. Goeree and Holt (2005) use data on the participation games reported by Schram and
Sonnemans (1996a, b) and estimate 0.8 for early rounds and 0.4 for late rounds.
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probability of a strategic vote is more than three times as high for high intermediate
utility than for um = 3. For um = 8 the model predicts that approximately 30 % of
the voters will vote strategically for these l values.
2.1.2 Informed setting
Consider next the game with full information. Start with an example with equal
share, which can serve as a comparison to the a priori expected situation for
uninformed voters in Fig. 1. Figure 2 plots the principal branch of the MLC for
Fig. 1 Multinomial logit correspondences for uninformed voters. Lines show the principle branch of the
MLC for high (um = 8) and low (um = 3) values of the intermediate option. Panel b zooms in on
l [ [0,1]
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small [(NABC, NBCA, NCAB) = (4, 4, 4)] voting bodies (see online Appendix E for
N = 99). In these cases all voters’ circumstances are again perfectly symmetric. In
comparison to the previous case, however, information about others’ preferences
removes the uncertainty. The Nash equilibrium of sincere voting is the limiting
MLE when the inter-mediate option is relatively unattractive (um = 3). For um = 8,
the probability of strategic voting converges to 0.12 as l;0 for N = 12. Hence, the
MLE converges to mixed strategy Nash equilibria with (small) positive probabilities
of voting strategically. Other results are quite similar to the uninformed case. The
probabilities of voting for the dominated option are small for l\ 1 and large
Fig. 2 Multinomial logit correspondences for informed voters. Lines show the principle branch of the
MLC for high (um = 8) and low (um = 3) values of the intermediate option. (NABC, NBCA, NCAB) = (4, 4,
4). Panel b zooms in on l [ [0,1]
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differences in strategic voting are predicted between um = 8 and um = 3 when
l [ [0.4, 0.8].
The equal split case is just one of the many distributions that may be realized
(and revealed). In cases where the revealed distribution is unequal, one may expect
patterns very different from the uninformed case of Fig. 1. Online appendix C
shows the MLC graphs for all possible realizations in the N = 12 case. Online
Appendix D provides for each realization the Nash equilibria selected by the
limiting MLE. Figure 3 presents the weighted average of these MLCs, where the
weights are given by the probabilities that specific realizations of the preference
distribution will occur. Therefore, the equilibria in Fig. 3 represent average
behavior across multiple committee votes with complete information.
Note that the average of the limiting Nash equilibria across preference configurations
is not to vote sincerely. The limiting MLE predicts a weighted average of 73 %/76 %
sincere voting and 24 %/22 % strategic voting for low and high intermediate value,
respectively. Starting with very small l, the roles are reversed: the MLE predicts more
strategic voting when the intermediate value is high. Large differences in strategic
voting are predicted between um = 8 and um = 3 when l [ [0.4, 0.8].
Based on l [ [0.4, 0.8], the analysis of the Principal Branch of the MLC yields a
first set of behavioral predictions for N = 12, which we will test with our
experimental data.
1. Without information, the probability of strategic voting is increasing in the
importance of the intermediate option (Fig. 1).
2. With full information the probability of strategic voting is increasing in the
importance of the intermediate option (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3 Average multinomial logit correspondences for informed voters. Lines show the weighted average
of the principle branches of the MLCs for high (um = 8) and low (um = 3) values of the intermediate
option. The average is across all possible combinations of preference orderings, weighted by the
probabilities with which they occur
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3. When the value of the intermediate option is low, there is more strategic voting
with information than without (Figs. 1 vs. 3).
In order to further structure the analysis, a few definitions are useful:
Definition 1 The Majoritarian Set is the set of alternatives with the highest
number of votes if all voters vote sincerely.
Definition 2 The Majoritarian Candidate is the (set of) alternative(s) from the
Majoritarian set with the highest number of votes if all voters vote sincerely for an
alternative within the set.
If the Majoritarian Set is singleton it equals the Majoritarian Candidate. If it
contains two elements (two options with equal sincere support, a third with less),
then the Majoritarian Candidate is the option that gives highest utility to the
supporters of the third option. The Majoritarian Candidate is unique, except when
(NABC, NBCA, NCAB) = (4, 4, 4).
For any distribution of preferences we now first classify voters based on the rank
of their most preferred candidate.8
Definition 3 The Rank-Type of a voter is given by:
Rank 1st Voter whose most preferred candidate is the Majoritarian Candidate.
Rank 2nd Voter whose most preferred candidate is second in the (sincere) polls.
Rank 3rd Voter whose most preferred candidate is third in the (sincere) polls.
By ‘sincere polls’ we mean the ranking that occurs if all voters vote sincerely.
Duverger’s law suggests that the Rank 3rd voters will be most likely to vote
strategically. However, the incentive to do so depends on the position of the
Majoritarian Candidate in their preference ordering. For example, consider (NABC,
NBCA, NCAB) = (5, 4, 3). The Majoritarian Candidate is A and voters with preference
ordering CAB are Rank 3rd. If voters with preference ABC vote sincerely, the Rank
3rd voters have no direct reason to vote strategically; their least preferred candidate
will probably not win anyway. In contrast, Rank 2nd voters (preference BCA) may
vote strategically in an attempt at a majority coalition with the Rank 3rd. Instead of
the Rank-Type, the probability of strategic voting may therefore be determined by
the benefits that the Majoritarian candidate gives to other voters than Rank 1st. We
therefore define:
Definition 4 The Incentive-Type of a voter is given by:
Supporter Voter with the Majoritarian Candidate as the most preferred
alternative.
8 We deal with ties as follows. If (NABC, NBCA, NCAB) = (4, 4, 4), all voters are ranked 1st. If the
Majoritarian Set has two elements, supporters of the Majoritarian Candidate are ranked 1st, supporters of
the other candidate in the set are ranked 2nd and the remaining voters are ranked 3rd. If the Majoritarian
Set is singleton and the two other preference orderings have equal support, all voters not supporting the
Majoritarian Candidate are ranked 2nd.
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Compromiser Voter with the Majoritarian Candidate as 2nd most preferred
alternative.
Opposer Voter with the Majoritarian Candidate as the least preferred alternative.
Note that the Rank 1st and Supporters are by construction the same group, but
Rank 2nd (Rank 3rd) can be either Opposers (Compromisers) or Compromisers
(Opposers). We can then identify four combination of Rank-Types and Incentives-
Types other than Rank 1st. Online Appendix F presents and analyzes the
equilibrium predictions for these combinations. Here, we use the analysis to derive
an additional three behavioral predictions:
4. With full information Rank 3rd voters vote more strategically (on average) than
other Rank-Types (Figure F1 in online Appendix F).
5. With full information and low value for the intermediate option, Opposers are
more likely to vote strategically than Compromisers.
6. With full information and high value for the intermediate option, Compromisers
are more likely to vote strategically than Opposers.
3 Experimental design
12 sessions were run at the CREED laboratory at the University of Amsterdam, in
November–December 2008. 288 student subjects participated in 24 independent
electorates. Each session lasted about one and a half hours. In addition to a show-up
fee of €7, subjects were paid €0.05 per experimental point. Average earnings were
€20.46, including the show-up fee. The experiment was computerized using Z-tree
(Fischbacher 2007). Instructions can be found in online Appendix G. The design
aims at studying the impact on voting behavior of the relative importance of the
intermediate option and the extent of information. A full 2 9 2 combinatorial
design therefore requires four treatments. All variations were made across subjects.
The electorate is fixed during a session and consists of 12 voters. Each electorate
faces 40 independent elections. In every election, there are three possible preference
orderings, {(A, B, C); (B, C, A); (C, A, B)}, which are assigned with equal
probability to each subject. There is a new draw before every election. Draws are
independent across subjects and elections. Every individual is informed about his or
her own preferences before each election. All this is common knowledge. Every
experimental electorate experienced the same realization of the random draws (cf.
online Appendix H), enabling a perfect comparison across electorates. Note that
giving subjects a new preference ordering in each election has the advantage of
providing us with a rich set of compositions of the electorate. It does reduce the
learning effect, however.
In every election each subject is required to cast one vote for A, B or C. Plurality
rule determines the winner, with ties broken by equal probability random draw.
Subjects are paid in each round according to the rank of the winner in their own
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preference ordering. If the winner is the highest ranked option a subject is paid 10
points and for the lowest ranked 1 point. The value of the intermediate option is
constant for a given electorate and is either 3 or 8 according to the treatment. In the
informed treatments, participants know the aggregate induced preferences of all
voters before casting their vote in a round. Specifically, they are told how many
other voters where appointed to each of the three preference orderings. After each
election, the aggregate voting outcome is shown to all subjects. Table 1 summarizes
the design.
For each cell, we have observations from six electorates. In addition, in August
2007, two pilot sessions were run at Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas, Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil.9
We used data from this pilot to obtain an out-of-sample estimate of the MLE
parameter l, for which we found l = 0.55. This provides us with specific MLE
predictions for our experimental data.
4 Results
We start with a general overview of voters’ choices and election outcomes in
Sect. 4.1. Then, we study in more detail the occurrence of strategic voting across
treatments in Sect. 4.2 and choices by distinct types in Sect. 4.3. In Sect. 4.4 we
summarize our findings. Unless indicated otherwise, throughout this section our
statistical tests will be non-parametric using average numbers per electorate as units
of observation.
4.1 General overview
For a first impression of the data, Table 2 shows for each treatment the distribution
of votes across options. Because the labels A, B, and C have no real content, we
aggregate votes for most preferred, intermediate, and least preferred option.
A first thing to note is that we very rarely see subjects voting for the dominated,
least preferred option. Second, strategic voting (voting for the intermediate option)
is highest (almost 25 %) when the intermediate value is high and subjects are
informed about the preference distribution.10 A Kruskal–Wallis test shows that both
the fraction of sincere voting and the fraction of strategic voting differ significantly
across the four treatments (for sincere voting: v2 = 18.12, p\ 0.01, N = 24; for
strategic voting: v2 = 17.49, p\ 0.01, N = 24). Pairwise comparisons follow
below. This shows that the combination of information and the value attributed to a
voter’s second-best candidate significantly affect the decision whether or not to vote
strategically. We analyze the determinants of strategic voting in more details,
below.
9 Two differences with the experiments described here are an electorate size of 15 voters and a within-
subjects variation in information. Two electorates participated in the pilot.
10 Strategic behavior is not concentrated in a few subjects. A between subjects heterogeneity analysis
shows very low variability (the standard deviation is smaller than 0.03), indicating that aggregate average
behavior is a good indicator of individual behavior.
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Before doing so, we consider the election outcome. In particular, Fig. 4 shows,
across treatments, the fraction of elections where the winner was the Majoritarian
Candidate or in the Majoritarian Set.11 This shows that without information both are
better predictors of the election outcome when the intermediate value is low. This is
in line with intuition because behavioral prediction 1 is that less strategic voting is
to be expected when um = 3 which in turn will improve the chances of the
Table 1 Experimental design
Information
Intermediate option
Low importance (u = 3), uninformed Low importance (u = 3), informed
High importance (u = 8), uninformed High importance (u = 8), informed




um = 3 1:0.936 2:0.049 3:0.015 1:0.806 2:0.169 3:0.025
um = 8 1:0.798 2:0.192 3:0.010 1:0.740 2:0.245 3:0.015
Numbers give the fractions of voters in the treatment denoted by the combination of column and row that







low value high value low value high value 
uninformed informed 
Majoritaian Set Majoritarian Candidate Predictions 
Fig. 4 Majoritarian set and majoritarian candidate. Bars show for each treatment the fraction of election
outcomes that are, respectively in the Majoritarian Set or equal to the Majoritarian Candidate. Dots denote
the theoretical predictions
11 In case of ties (i.e., randomly chosen winner), we did as follows. If only one of the tied options was in
the Majoritarian Set, we counted this as a 0.5 success. If one of the two (three) winners was the
Majoritarian Candidate we counted the winner as 0.5 (0.33).
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Majoritarian Candidate. Moreover, information leads to strong coordination around
the Majoritarian Candidate, which wins over 93 % of the elections.
4.2 Strategic voting
For each treatment Fig. 5 shows the fraction of strategic votes across rounds. It
includes the MLE predictions based on the value for l estimated with the pilot data
A: Uninformed
B: Informed
Fig. 5 Experimental data and predictions. Lines show the 3-period moving average of the fraction of
strategic votes in the uninformed (panel a) and informed (panel b) sessions. Dashed (solid) lines refer to
low (high) intermediate values. Light lines show the 3-period moving average MLE predictions. Note that
in the informed case (panel b) the MLE prediction in a round depends on the realized distribution of
preferences
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(cf. Sect. 3). A first, general impression is that the MLE predictions for low
intermediate values fare quite well. For both the uninformed and the informed cases,
the data are close to the prediction. For high intermediate values, the observations
appear to be somewhat lower than predicted.
Comparing across treatments, we observe more strategic voting when the
intermediate value is high than when it is low. The difference is statistically
significant for both informed and uninformed voters (in both cases, Mann–Whitney
(MW), Z = -2.882, p\ 0.01, N = 12). This is in support of behavioral predictions
1 and 2 of Sect. 2. In short, even though the observed extent of strategic voting
when um = 8 is somewhat lower than predicted by MLE, the comparative static
prediction that it is higher than for um = 3 finds (strong) support in our data.
A comparison of panels A and B shows whether information affects strategic
voting. For low intermediate value, information is predicted to boost strategic voting
(behavioral prediction 3). More specifically, MLE predicts the fraction of strategic
votes to be 0.06 and 0.16, respectively, for uninformed and informed voters. We
observe fractions equal to 0.05 when voters are uninformed and 0.17 when they are
informed (cf. Table 2). In support of the prediction, the observed increase is
statistically significant (MW, Z = -2.882, p\ 0.01, N = 12). For high interme-
diate values, we observe on average 0.19 and 0.25 strategic votes for the uninformed
and informed cases, respectively, where 0.31 is predicted for both cases. This
difference is not statistically significant (MW, Z = -1.761, p = 0.09, N = 12).
Finally, note that Fig. 5 shows little evidence of learning across elections. As
mentioned above, our design with new preference draws in each election is not
favorable for learning (the only trend seems to be a decline in strategic voting in the
first 15 elections when subjects are uninformed and the intermediate value is low). It
is noticeable that the QRE predictions fare well even in this environment where
learning is difficult.
4.3 Voter types
Next, consider the variation of strategic behavior across voter types (Rank-Types
and Incentive Types). Figure 6 shows this for the treatment with information
(without information, voters do not know their type). We clearly observe that Rank
3rd voters vote more strategically. In fact, they vote more often strategically than
sincerely. Rank 1st voters basically never vote strategically and Rank 2nd voters
vote strategically often, but less than half of the time.
Behavioral prediction 4 is that Rank 3rd voters vote strategically more often than
the other rank types. Tests support this prediction and also show that Rank 2nd types
vote strategically more often than supporters do. This holds for both low and high
intermediate value (in all comparisons: W, Z = -2.201, p = 0.03; N = 6).12 For a
further comparison of Rank 2nd and Rank 3rd types, we distinguish between
opposers and compromisers in both cases. The difference between strategic voting
12 The reason why the test statistic often has the same value is that in all tests, the ranks are unanimous
across the 6 electorates for any comparison. 6 out of 6 positive ranks gives Z = 2.201 and p = 0.028 in
the Wilcoxon test.
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of Rank 3rd and 2nd types is statistically significant for compromisers as well as for
opposers. This again holds for low and high intermediate values (all tests, W,
Z = -2.201, p = 0.03; N = 6). Together, these results provide strong support for
the fourth behavioral prediction.
Behavioral prediction 5 is that Opposers vote more strategically than Compro-
misers for low intermediate value. We observe the opposite: less strategic voting by
Opposers (0.29) than by Compromisers (0.44). The difference is statistically
significant (W, Z = -1.992, p = 0.05, N = 6), a clear rejection of prediction 5. For
high intermediate value, behavioral prediction 6 is that Compromisers will vote
more strategically than Opposers. This is indeed observed in our data, where the
fraction of strategic votes is 0.63 and 0.38, respectively. The difference is
statistically significant (W, Z = -2.201, p = 0.03, N = 6), in support of the
prediction.
All of the previous tests have been univariate and based on average results per
electorate. To increase the power of the tests we consider the data as deriving from a
panel where every participant votes in 40 elections and conduct a probit regression
explaining the individual choice to vote at a particular election, with random effects
at the electorate level. Table 3 presents the estimated marginal effects. We have
added a variable indicating the period number (divided by 10) to allow for learning
effects (which we again do not observe). We also added a dummy variable
indicating elections where one of the options was supported by an absolute majority,
because in this case strategic voting may simply be seen as futile. This was the case
in 27.5 % of the elections. The results show that the probability of voting
strategically is 3.5 % points lower in these rounds, when the intermediate value is
high (the effect for low value is statistically insignificant). Other factors remain
important, however.
The results also show that, irrespective of the intermediate value, Rank 2nd and
3rd voters are both more likely to vote strategically than Supporters (the category
absorbed in the constant term), and that Rank 3rd voters are most likely to vote
strategically. This confirms the results from our univariate analyses. In fact, Rank










Supporter Compromiser Opposer Compromiser Opposer 
Rank-1st Rank-2nd Rank-3rd 
low value (u=3) 
high value (u=8) 
Fig. 6 Strategic voting and voter types. Bars show for the informed treatment the fraction of votes that
were strategic. Voter types are distinguished along the horizontal axis and the intermediate value
treatments by the color of the bar
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Supporters. The effect of incentive-type is smaller. With low intermediate value it
does not matter statistically whether one is Supporter, Compromiser, or Opposer.
When um = 8, both Compromisers and Opposers vote more often strategically than
Supporters do, but the difference between the two is statistically insignificant. Com-
promisers have a 31 %-point higher probability of voting strategically than
Supporters do.
4.4 Summarizing the results
MLE predicts behavior in the experimental setting reasonably well. Data support
various behavioral predictions at the aggregate level as well as the comparative
statics for our treatments. In particular, we observe that
Table 3 Strategic voting
Intermediate value
Low (um = 3) High (um = 8)
Constant (coefficient) -2.677** -1.947**
Period/10 0.006 0.003
Simple majority 0.013 -0.035*
Compromiser 0.148 0.306**
Opposer 0.079 0.207**
Rank 2nd 0.207** 0.247**
Rank 3rd 0.542** 0.567**
Rank 2nd 9 opposer 0.002 -0.056
Rank 3rd 9 opposer 0.059 0.019
Test rank 2nd = Rank 3rd v2 = 53.5 (p\ 0.001)** v2 = 48.8 (p\ 0.001)**
Test compromiser = opposer v2 = 0.34 (p = 0.559) v2 = 0.74 (p = 0.390)
Test rank 2nd: compromiser = opposer v2 = 8.53 (p = 0.004)** v2 = 32.9 (p\ 0.001)**
Test rank 3rd: compromiser = opposer v2 = 0.220 (p = 0.641) v2 = 1.78 (p = 0.182)
The table presents the results of a random effects probit regression model where the dependent variable is
a dummy indicating whether or not voter i in electorate j voted strategically in election t. Formally, it
gives the marginal effects derived from the regression model Pr
ij





probability that i of j votes strategically in t. U denotes the cumulative normal distribution and X is the
vector of independent variables described in the first column of the table. lj is a (white noise) electorate-
specific error that corrects for the dependencies across individual decision in the same group. The
independent variable ‘Simple Majority’ is a dummy variable indicating situations where one of the
preference orderings had an absolute majority of at least 7. The independent variables with an ‘x’ between
variables indicate interaction terms. To avoid the dummy trap, the variable indicating Rank 1st voters
(i.e., Supporters) has been left out of the regression. The tests depicted in the last two rows test equality of
the estimated coefficients. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of quadrature points; when varying
these points all differences are smaller than 10-8
* (**) denotes statistical significance at the 5 % (1 %)-level
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• With and without information, the probability of strategic voting is increasing in
the importance of the intermediate option;
• With low intermediate value, there is more strategic voting with information
than without;
• With high intermediate value there is no statistically significant effect of
information.
When considering behavior disaggregated per type of voter, our data support the
prediction that
• With full information Rank 3rd voters are more likely to vote strategically than
Rank 2nd voters (and both more often vote strategically than Rank 1st do).
and we observe that
• Compromisers vote more strategically than Opposers and both more than
Supporters.
MLE predicts this comparative statics only for high intermediate value.
5 Concluding remarks
We study a voting environment characterized by the regular occurrence of
Condorcet cycles in preferences. Voters are faced with the decision of voting
sincerely or strategically. They know their own preference, but may or may not have
information about the distribution of preferences across the electorate. When this
information is available, certain characteristics of this distribution (such as the rank
of the support for one’s most preferred candidate or the relative position of the
plurality-preferred candidate in one’s preference ordering) may become important
in determining what to vote for. The way such factors affect the probability of
voting strategically is partly captured by the predictions derived by adding bounded
rationality to a standard utilitarian voting model and deriving the MLE.
Our goal has been to establish whether or not people vote strategically, and what
factors affect the probability of doing so. We excluded one obvious candidate for
strategic voting, i.e., situations with a Condorcet loser. Instead, we created an
environment in which options are a priori symmetric and where Condorcet cycles
are likely to occur. In this environment, one that is regularly observed in the field, a
strategic vote aims at securing one’s second-preferred option instead of trying to
have the most-preferred option win. Our boundedly-rational equilibrium model
allows us to derive theoretical predictions on strategic voting. In this way, the
equilibrium analysis provides an important tool for understanding the strategic vote.
In the end, whether or not voters vote strategically is an empirical question,
however. Laboratory control has allowed us to provide answers to this question. We
know exactly when a subject in the experiment votes strategically. By varying
model parameters one at a time, we were able to establish that voters vote more
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strategically when the relative value of the second-preferred option increases but
that knowing the distribution of preferences makes strategic voting more likely if
this relative value is low.
Laboratory control has also allowed us to study in detail who votes strategically.
We find strong evidence for the (intuitive) MLE prediction that voters who prefer
the candidate with the largest support (the ‘Majoritarian Candidate’) vote sincerely
for this candidate. For strategic voting by other voters, two characteristics of their
preferences may play a role. First, it may matter whether a voter has the
Majoritarian Candidate as a second or third preferred option. In the former case, she
may decide to vote strategically in an attempt to help the supporters of this
candidate to obtain a majority. Second, it may matter how a voter’s most preferred
candidate ranks in a poll where everyone votes sincerely. If this rank is lowest, the
voter may vote strategically believing that her most preferred candidate does not
stand a chance. Our data show that the second argument is more important than the
first. Compared to a supporter of the Majoritarian Candidate, a supporter of the
lowest ranked candidate has a more than 50 %-point higher probability of voting
strategically.
Of course, a downside of using laboratory experiments is that we were forced to
restrict the analysis to committee-size voting bodies. The confirmation of the main
MLE-predictions for committees does give some confidence in their predictions for
larger voting bodies, however (see Levine and Palfrey 2007 for a similar argument
with respect to voter turnout experiments). Moreover, there is ample empirical
evidence (reviewed in Sect. 1) that substantial strategic voting takes place even at
national elections. Hence, the question is not whether strategic voting takes place,
but what the causes and effects of strategic voting are. Our design and results pertain
to this question.
In our introduction, we argued that a sufficient condition for correct aggregation
of preferences is that every voter casts a vote for her most preferred alternative. If
this occurs, the winner is in the set of Majoritarian Candidates 100 % of the time. In
our experiment, we observe this 72–88 % of the time with uninformed voters and
93–96 % of the time when voters know each others’ preferences (cf. Fig. 4). From
our laboratory results, we therefore conclude that revelation of the distribution of
preferences (e.g., through opinion polls) is sufficient for voting to correctly
aggregate preferences in this way.13 With such polls, the plurality’s desire is usually
honored, even when some voters vote strategically. We conclude that information
works as a coordination device around the victory of the Majoritarian Candidate. In
summary, information impacts voting behavior by increasing strategic behavior in
some situations, differentiating voting patterns across types, and promoting a higher
chance of victory for the Majoritarian Candidate.
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